Africa’s ‘frenemies’

 They say you know a friend when he stands with you through thick and thin, not when he cherry-picks with largesse that holds you in thrall for whatever the motive may be. True, relations between countries are anchored fundamentally on respective self-interest, but there are causes that should inspire alliances and unite objectives at crucial moments – for collective wellbeing, if not in express support for peculiar interest of the other party. Russia and China lately failed this test and betrayed duplicity in their ties with Africa. Not that Russia ever showed much interest in the continent, but China has been a benefactor of sorts: it built the African Union (AU) headquarter complex in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as a gift and is a major lender at concessional rather than commercial rates to many countries, Nigeria inclusive. But it is doubtful it looks out for the continent / countries beyond the gifts and loans that many suspect are for neo-colonial purposes.

China and Russia on Tuesday, last week, blocked a proposed resolution of the United Nations Security Council drafted by France to support the decision by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to impose a raft of sanctions on Mali, which is in the hold of a military junta that seized power in August 2020 and is foot-dragging on steering the country back to civil rule. Colonel Assimi Goita had led the army to sack President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita amid street protests against Keita’s unpopular rule; but faced with threats of sanctions on the heels of the coup, he had installed an interim government led by civilians and promised to hold elections in February 2022 to restore substantive civil rule. Following that first coup, ECOWS had shuttered Mali’s borders, imposed trade restrictions and suspended the country from its decision-making organs, but when the junta installed a civilian-led interim government and pledged early elections, the economic sanctions were lifted although Mali remained suspended from the bloc’s main bodies. Goita, however, staged another coup in May 2021 by which he dismantled the interim civilian government and upended the timetable to restore democracy. He declared himself interim president, and when ECOWAS insisted on elections holding February 2022, he said he would only set a new date after a nationwide conference had been organised. At the end of the purported conference in December, last year, the junta said it envisaged a transition programme that would last four years beginning from this January, thus pushing elections to December 2025 instead of February 2022 originally agreed with ECOWAS. Mali’s political class roundly rejected the new plan and demanded early polls.

ECOWAS said it found the new timetable totally unacceptable, because it “simply means that an illegitimate military transition government will take the Malian people hostage.” At the end of the extraordinary summit of leaders in the Ghanaian capital, Accra, penultimate Sunday, the 15-member bloc unveiled a regime of tough sanctions against the Mali junta, which included immediate closure of land and air borders with Mali and recall of ambassadors from Bamako; suspension of non-essential financial transactions, including a ban on all trade except in pharmaceuticals and other humanitarian items; and freezing of Malian state assets in ECOWAS central and commercial banks. The bloc also activated its standby force in readiness for “any eventuality.” Pursuant to the sanctions regime, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) instructed all financial institutions under its umbrella to suspend Mali with immediate effect, thereby severing the country’s access to regional financial markets. 

The tough stance by ECOWAS was in the face of military interventions in power that seemed to be festering in the sub-region and beyond, and destabilising affected polities. Within 12 months up to September 2021, democracy was undermined four times in West Africa – with two military takeovers in Mali, a failed coup attempt in Niger and another coup in Guinea. That is not counting the killing by rebel fighters in April 2021 of former President Idriss Déby of Chad and his extra-constitutional succession by his 37-year-old son and four-star General, Mahamat Idriss Déby. And in October 2021, there was the military takeover of power in Sudan. In brazen stand-up to ECOWAS, the Mali junta condemned its sanctions as “illegal and illegitimate.” A military spokesman said on the basis of reciprocity, Mali had “decided to recall its ambassadors and close its land and air borders with all the states concerned.” Also speaking in an address to the nation last Monday, the military leader, Colonel Goita, called the sanctions “inhumane” but stated that Mali remained open to dialogue.

“Nigeria hankers after Chinese loans…because of concessionary terms attached. We could ask: how well-intentioned are those concessions?”

France, Mali’s former colonial power which currently holds the European Union’s rotating presidency, rooted for the ECOWAS sanctions. “We are in complete solidarity with the region and with this very courageous and clear (ECOWAS) stance,” French President Emmanuel Macron told reporters in Paris, while his country’s envoy took the issue up in closed-door Security Council consultations last Tuesday by proposing a council resolution backing ECOWAS. Washington as well pitched in with ECOWAS and urged the Mali regime to honour its pledge to restore democracy. “A five-year transition is not in their interest and extends the pain of the people,” US ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield told a Security Council meeting. But Russia and China blocked the draft resolution by France and effectively shielded the Mali junta. Chinese ambassador Dai Bing argued that Mali is in the middle of a critical transition period and outside forces must refrain from exerting excess pressure on the country. Taking note of ECOWAS sanctions and the response by the Mali regime, he urged both sides to dialogue and resolve regional issues, which was diplomatese for saying ‘stew in your own juice.’ Russia rejected the proposed council resolution as unbalanced and voiced sympathy for the Mali junta. “We understand and are cognisant of the difficulties encountered by the Malian authorities in preparing for general elections,” Russian ambassador Vassily Nebenzia said. Alluding to the uprising since 2012 that has left swaths of the Mali in the hands of insurgents, he added: “We concur with the fact that without restoration of government control in many parts of the country, it will be difficult to view the vote as legitimate.” If you stretch his logic, he implied that Goita would be justified to shelve elections until he manages to undo an insurgency that has been on for 10 years and is still running.

Military intervention in power is bad for Africa and has contributed to the instability that grossly undermined development on the continent, hence ECOWAS’ keenness to arrest this trend. China and Russia do not share that concern. China’s motive for blocking the Security Council resolution may be no more than apathy towards the political health of Mali, and by extension that of West Africa and ultimately all of Africa. But that of Russia goes deeper and can’t be divorced from pecuniary interest in the Mali crisis, because fighters from Russia recently moved into Mali to bolster the military junta. French envoy Nicolas de Riviere highlighted this factor when he restated his country’s condemnation of deployment of mercenaries from Russia’s Wagner Group, lamenting that Mali’s transitional authorities “are using already limited public funds to pay foreign mercenaries instead of supporting the national forces and public services for the benefit of the Malian people.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov didn’t deny there are Russian fighters in Mali, he only said the deal was with a private firm without the Russian government being involved. And he defended the transaction, saying the Russian company had “legitimate” right to be in the West African nation because it was invited by the transitional government. Neither did Mali deny the deal. Its UN ambassador Issa Konfourou told the Security Council there are no mercenaries on Malian soil, but that Russian trainers are in Mali to advise and train the country’s military on the use of military equipment acquired from the government from Russia.

It isn’t new that world powers profit from distress and desolation in developing nations. But developing nations ought be guided by knowing that the fondness you may profess for a dainty cockerel does not go beyond its stewing in a pepper pot. Nigeria hankers after Chinese loans, which stood at $4.1billion as of September 2021, because of concessionary terms attached. We could ask: how well-intentioned are those concessions?