Ecowas and juntas’ ‘trexit’

It was a foreseen bend in the road that wasn’t long in dawning. Tensions between the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) and three junta-led member-states boiled over as the countries lately announced their exit from the regional bloc. Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, in a joint act, said they were making a “sovereign decision” to leave Ecowas because the bloc allegedly had “drifted from the ideals of its founding fathers and the spirit of pan-Africanism.” They also accused the body of not having assisted them in their struggle against jihadist violence, saying the regional bloc “under the influence of foreign powers, betraying its founding principles, has become a threat to member-states and peoples.” 

The grounds adduced by the trio for their exit were effectively an excuse for respective junta’s resolve to hold onto power in defiance of pressure by Ecowas to restore civil rule. Military power grabs occurred in Mali in 2020 and 2021, in Burkina Faso in 2022 and in Niger in 2023, souring relations with the regional body that has constitutional governance in member-states as a major guiding principle. With the juntas dallying on returning power to elected civilians, they made their countries into rogue states of Ecowas – with membership suspended and stiff sanctions imposed to force speedy return to democracy. For some while last year, Ecowas contemplated military intervention in Niger but later settled for dialogue.

In their joint statement, the three countries said they decided “in complete sovereignty on immediate withdrawal” from Ecowas. That was another rogue step because the treaty of the 15-nation bloc requires member-states wishing to withdraw to serve written notice a year in advance, and continue to abide by the bloc’s protocols while the notice lasts. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso are founding members of the 49-year-old Ecowas, but they aren’t the only members to have pulled out since the body’s inauguration. Mauritania was the 16th member-state before it withdrew in December 2000 after expiration of a one-year notice to focus on her membership of the North African Maghreb Union. But the troika, in announcing immediate withdrawal, accused the regional body of failing to support their fight against terrorism and insecurity while imposing “illegal, illegitimate, inhumane and irresponsible sanctions.” They apparently had the Ecowas exit in sight last September when they formed a mutual defence pact called the Alliance des États du Sahel (The Alliance of Sahel States). 

Ecowas, in its reaction, denied having received formal notification from the three states about their intention to withdraw from the community. “Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali remain important members of the Community and the Authority remains committed to finding a negotiated solution to the political impasse,” it said in a statement. Shortly after that statement, however, Mali and Burkina Faso said they had sent the regional body “formal notice” of their withdrawal from the bloc, with Niger expected to follow suit. 

Regional powerhouse, Nigeria, expressed sadness over the three countries’ decision and accused the juntas of engaging in “public posturing to deny their people the sovereign right to make fundamental choices over their freedom of movement, freedom to trade and freedom to choose their own leaders.” A Foreign Affairs Ministry statement said Nigeria stood with Ecowas to “emphasise due process and our shared commitment to protect and strengthen the rights and welfare of all citizens of member-states,” adding that while the country had worked in good faith to reach out to all members of the Ecowas family to resolve common challenges, it had become clear that not all members shared “the same good faith.”

“Juntas’ exit from Ecowas has dire consequences for both sides”

Ecowas was established in 1975 with one goal: “To promote co-operation and integration…in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability.” The exit of the three states obviously sets back this goal, but not without adverse fallouts for the states themselves. First is the freedom of movement and trade their citizens ought to enjoy, as the Foreign Affairs Ministry statement mentioned. Under Ecowas protocols, nationals of member-states can move freely across borders and trade in those countries without immigration hurdles. In simplistic terms, that is why you have many Nigeriens and Malians pursuing their livelihood in Nigeria without hindrance (some of them are neighbourhood vendors and domestic staff like drivers and security personnel), while many Nigerians are equally in those countries plying different trades. With the withdrawal from Ecowas, such liberties will be curtailed: there will be immigration hurdles and limitations on what respective national can do in the other’s country. Malians, Nigeriens and Burkinabes will be more burdened because they will face such hurdles in 12 Ecowas states, whereas Ecowas nationals will have the three states to contend with.

On the political level, nationals of the three countries are stuck with the juntas because if they are no longer part of the Ecowas bloc, there is no motivation to urgently restore democratic rule. In other words, the juntas may as well take all the time in the world to ease out for elected persons if they ever do. Meanwhile, the once-friendly relations between the three countries and developed nations in the West and Europe had soured following the coups. The juntas distanced themselves from former colonial power, France, and cuddled up to Russia that has been welcoming and playing into the anti-French sentiment by projecting itself as a country that never colonised Africa. Some military assistance is also on the cards. Russian mercenary group, Wagner, is already in Mali to support its army in battling armed insurgents, while Burkina Faso lately received Russian soldiers to “strengthen military and strategic cooperation” between the two countries. Russian and Nigerien officials also recently parleyed. But it remains to be seen how much substantial help Russia can offer in tackling the jihadist scourge.

Pertaining to economy, the withdrawal from Ecowas could further weaken economic development in the three Sahel states that already rank among the world’s poorest. The three countries may yet pull out of the West African CFA franc, which would hamstring their commerce with Francophone regional neighbours. Besides, the states are landlocked and exit from Ecowas portends disruption of trade between them and littoral West African states on which they rely for exports and imports. Analysts were reported saying though some trade could be re-routed through coastal Guinea – also on suspension from the bloc since 2021 following its own military coup – loss of access to the large Ecowas single market and free movement that bloc membership confers will have dire consequences for the three economies.

That said, Ecowas has its own learning curve. Besides the ordeal of jihadist insurrection hobbling the three states, they had complained of exploitation by France in their ties with the former colonial power, which had deeply impoverished their citizens despite rich natural resources the countries respectively harbour. The juntas cited these challenges that were not being redressed by elected leaders as part of reasons why those leaders had to be ousted in coups that were staged so the people could “take their destiny into their own hands.” Analysts noted that leaders in Ecowas had not peer-reviewed on good governance and encouraged one another to rise up to their peoples’ expectations, but only raised hell when leaders were sacked for dereliction. In effect, Ecowas appears to have become a self-serving club of leaders looking out for the interest of one another only and not that of the people they were chosen to lead. One analyst was quoted saying: “Ecowas needs to have protocols and mechanisms in place to begin to respond to situations of insecurity and instability before it leads to a point where governments are actually overthrown. I ask this question: at what point is the constitution of a country actually subverted? Is it at the point where leaders become irresponsible, or is it when (the) military responds to that?” Ecowas ought to be a responsible body looking out for the interest of citizens of member-states, and not a club defending the interest of leaders whether they do well or not.

If the three states pull through with their exit, Ecowas will have to live with a diminished sphere of influence. But worse is the possible knock-on effect. Military actors in other countries could well conclude that all it takes to deal with Ecowas’s aversion for coups is pulling out membership. That could become an incentive for power grabs and lead to extinction of Ecowas. Hence, the regional body must resolve this ‘trexit’ as would dissuade potential emulators. Bottomline is that the juntas’ exit from Ecowas has dire consequences for both sides.