BRICS and Brazilian poll

On Sunday, October 25th, Brazil will hold a run-off election brought on by the inconclusiveness of its presidential poll that took place on October 5th. Left- wing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva will square off with right-wing Flávio Bolsonaro, who led in the first round but fell short of prescribed victory threshold of more than 50 percent of votes cast. 

Flávio, 45-year-old son of imprisoned former President Jair Bolsonaro, finished ahead of Lula with 47 percent of the votes despite that polls had forecast he would come in second place. Lula, 80-year-old, who was projected to win, came second with 44.9 percent of the votes according to data published by Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court. Voting is compulsory in the world’s fifth-largest country, and turnout is typically among the highest in the Americas.

Lula, who is running on the platform of Workers’ Party (PT), is seeking a fourth and likely his last term after having been elected in 2002 and 2006, and later for a non-consecutive term in 2022. With the latter election, he staged a remarkable political comeback, defeating Jair Bolsonaro by less than two percent of the vote – the closest presidential contest in Brazil’s history. Before returning to power, he had spent some 580 days in prison on corruption convictions that Brazil’s Supreme Court overturned in 2021 and restored his political rights.

For his part, Flávio exceeded expectations by his showing in the first round, meaning the run-off is his to lose, especially as many candidates knocked out in the first round were right-wing alternatives whose supporters could now gravitate to him. Moreover, his Liberal Party (PL) produced most governors, senators and federal deputies in this last poll and is projected to wield the biggest influence in Congress. Besides, most Latin American countries have in recent times elected right-wing leaders aligned towards United States’ President Donald Trump, and Sunday’s run-off will determine whether Brazil toes that line.

Lula and Bolsonaro are the two biggest names in Brazil’s politics, and are pitched on polar ends – left and right – of the political spectrum. Following the 2022 election, Jair Bolsonaro’s supporters in January 2023 rioted and vandalised government buildings. The ex-president was banned from running for re-election even before his sentencing to prison, hence he endorsed his eldest son, Flávio, to run in his place and carry forward the political movement built around him. 

Jair Bolsonaro, now under humanitarian house arrest for health reasons, is serving a 27-year sentence after being convicted of attempting a coup to overturn his 2022 election loss. But he remains a factor electorally. Besides Flávio’s brilliant showing in the October 5th election, Jair Bolsonaro’s wife, Michelle, got elected to the Senate. As part of his electioneering, Flávio pledged to grant his father and his supporters who were convicted for the January 2023 riots amnesty, if elected.

The choice facing Brazilians on Sunday, however, reaches beyond domestic politics and could reshape how Brazil stands on the world stage. The outcome of the vote may determine whether the country – Latin America’s largest nation and economy – tilts toward the growing conservative bloc aligned with Trump or continues Lula’s pursuit of a multi-polar foreign alignment. 

Like his father, Flávio is a buddy of Trump and he touted his friendship with the American leader as a selling point of his candidature. Last year, Trump used the coup trial of Jair Bolsonaro as justification for imposing tariffs on Brazil and sanctioning some top Lula administration officials as well as judges in Brazilian judiciary. About mid-this year, Flávio successfully persuaded Washington to designate two Brazilian gangs as terrorist organisations. A win for the Bolsonaro heir would likely see Brazil join US-promoted ‘Shield of Americas’ coalition against narco-trafficking and align more closely with Washington.

“A Bolsonaro-led Brazil could leave BRICS in severe internal dysfunction… (and) Nigeria could lose a veritable window for expanding trade opportunities.”

Lula, for his part, made Brazil’s sovereignty a peg of his campaign and at times accused the US of trying to interfere in, and influence his country’s elections – something that Washington denied. He objected to the US designating Brazilian groups terrorist organisations because applying that framework, he argued, could become a pretext for foreign intervention. Not that he condoned the gangs, though. Proof: he introduced reforms to tackle financial networks enabling organised crime, strengthen homicide investigations and fortify prisons. 

The Brazilian incumbent has continued to champion multilateralism while distancing his country from the US. This is evidenced in the country’s official trade data showing China as Brazil’s leading export market since 2009, and with the lead widening sharply since Trump came to power. 

Brasilia’s relationship with Trump further soured with Washington’s tariff agenda. An initial flashpoint came in July 2025 when Trump announced tariffs on many Brazilian goods, citing what his administration dubbed politically motivated prosecution of Jair Bolsonaro. Those tariffs were rolled back in November. But trade tension returned in 2026 summer when Trump imposed fresh tariffs on certain Brazilian goods that are still in effect today. Lula rejected the tariffs and threatened to retaliate against the US, although he has said he would hold off the threatened measure while negotiations with Washington continued.

Lula brought the sovereignty argument onto the world stage at the United Nations General Assembly in September. “Brazil is nobody’s backyard,” he said, while accusing “some Brazilian politicians” of aligning themselves with foreign interests that are at odds with the country’s own interest – remarks widely seen as aimed at Flávio Bolsonaro. His animus extends to other frontiers, as he is also critical of US ally, Israel, over its conduct in Gaza. Two days after his UN speech, Brazilian diplomats joined representatives of many other countries in walking out as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu began to address the General Assembly.

Flávio Bolsonaro takes a markedly different approach, cultivating ties with Trump, Netanyahu and other leaders that Lula has issues with. There is no question that a win for him in Sunday’s poll would cement Latin America’s move to the right over the last two years. The question is where that would leave BRICS, the global south economic bloc of which Brazil is an eponymous member. There are 11 full member countries in BRICS and 10 partner countries, among them Nigeria, although the name is an acronym coined from five countries namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

Questions have been asked as to whether BRICS could lose its ‘B’ should Flávio win Sunday’s run-off. Straight answer: not likely. Brazil’s participation in BRICS could shift toward diplomatic distance and lower political engagement, but it will be constrained from full exit by heavy economic ties to China. These ties would make any serious effort to decouple from Beijing economically costly and politically difficult. During the administration of Flávio’s father, anti-China rhetoric did not prevent bilateral trade from reaching record levels. Flávio’s own program envisages continued commercial engagement with the world power.

Analysts argued, however, that Flávio could prioritise and strengthen Brazil’s efforts to become active in US-promoted Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), rather than pull its weight in BRICS and other multipolar blocs. People recall that he once said he would leave open the possibility of withdrawing from the bloc, although pulling through with a withdrawal is a different ball game from the rhetoric. Meaning, it could be easier said than done.

Still, a Bolsonaro administration, in desire to snuggle up to Washington, could halt Brazil’s backing for BRICS-led initiative to de-dollarise the global economy and create alternative payment systems. The beneficiary obviously would be Trump, whose bully tendencies have made other economic powerhouses – including historical allies like Europe and Canada – want to shake off US dominance in world economy. Bolsonaro’s inclination towards regional security initiatives like the ‘Shield of the Americas’ also contrasts with the multipolar, non-Western framing favoured by BRICS members like China and Russia.

In short, a Bolsonaro-led Brazil could leave BRICS in severe internal dysfunction. When Washington, in July 2025, slammed in a new tariffs slate, Nigeria was among 67 countries affected by the measure purportedly aimed at correcting trade imbalances, but which many perceived as a weapon by the Trump administration to force its way with other countries on the global stage. One of the issues suspected held against Nigeria was its warming up to BRICS and becoming a partner country. If BRICS gets weakened, Trump will be happy, but Nigeria could lose a veritable window for expanding trade opportunities.